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ABSTRACT
This paper  presents  a model  in which agents  choose  to use  money  as  a mediun of exchange,
a means  of payment, and a unit of accourt.  The paper defines  conditions  under which
nominal contracts, promisiug future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money,
prove  .to be the optimal contract  form in the presence  of either relative or aggretate  price
risk.  When relative  prices  are random,  nominal contracts  are  optimal if individuals  have  es
ozfe similar preferences  over future  consumption.  When the aggregate  price level is
random,  whether  ftom shocks  to the money  supply  or aggregate  aversion.  In addition,  they
may be optimal if  the repayment of contracts is subject to  a binding cash-in-advance
constraint. In this case,  a contingent  contract increases  the risk of holding  excessive  cash
bala,nces.
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One  of the Breatest  economic  puzzles  in an age  of widely varying, random  rates  of inllation
is the persistent  use of nominal contracts,  that is, of promises  of a future payment  of a
prespecified,  uncontingent  sum of fiat money. The goal of this paper  is to suggest  reasons
why  such contlacts might  represent the  optimal  contract form  in  a  large. class of
mvrtonments.
The starting point  of  our  analysis is  the observation that  every intlividual is
generally  a party to several  contracts  with several  other individuals. Eence  in this paper
we study a general  equilibrium model in which the equilibrium cotrtract  form is optimal
given  the contlact form elsewhere  in the economy. We consider  two kinds of shocks' One
induces  a relative price shock,  the other an aggregate  price level shock. We show  that
there are reasonable  economic  environments  in which contracts  contingent  on either shock
aJe  not superior  to nominal contracts.
When there a,re  relative price shocks,  nominal (uncontingent)  contracts  are optimal
if (i) individuals do not know with certainty which commodities  they will want to consume
in  the  future;  (ii)  preference shocks are  trot  observed by  other  individuals;  and
(iii) individuats  are exposed,  ex.  ante,  to the same  kind of preference  uncertainty. The first
condition rules out the optimality of futures contracts  for specific  goods,  and the secoad
rules out making contracts  contingent  on realized  preferences.  The third implies that in
equilibrium individuals, being ec anfe  identical, will not wish to insure  each  other against
relative  price shocks.
When there are shocks  to the aggregate  price level, what matte$ is how alternative
contract  forms share  the risk amont cotrtracting  parties. In particular, if the cotrtracting
parties have the same  degree  of relative risk aversion,  au optimal contract system  sharesrisk equally.  I!  as in our model, the net aggregate  wealth of a generation  is coastant  in
nominal terms, a system of nominal contracts ensures  that  each inrlividual has fired
tromitral  risk.  In this way aggregate  price shocks,  whether  they stem fron  changes  in the
stock of goods  or the stock  of money,  affect  equally the wealth of every  individual.  If the
net wealth of a generation  includes  both real aud uominal components,  then nominal debt
contracts  together  with simpie equity shares  of the real component  of wealth are suf6cimt
to provide  optimal  risk  sharing.
Departures  from constant relative risk aversion  imply  that  there are gains Aom
having contracts contingent  on aggregate  shocks. But these  gains  are gererally a semnd
order of  magnitude, because  in  general, optimal  risk  sharing still  requires wealthier
individuals to bea.r  more risk, though uot uecessarily  in proportion  to their wealth. Eence,
small  costs of  incorporating contingencies  may  restore optimality  of  fixed  noninal
contracts,  even  if individuals differ in their risk attitudes.
When  contracts  are  payable in  fiat  money,  contingencies  that  reduce the
uncertainty of final real wealth generally  increase  the uncertainty of cash  flows.  Hence,
even  if the state of the world is costlessly  observable,  contingent  @ntracts  payable  in fiat
money  entail a cost:  it is the cost  of holding  enough  cash  to meet  the maximum contingent
paJment specified  by the contract.  We show  that for this reason  fixed nominal contracts
may be optimal evm if  there are agtretate shocks  obseryable  at no cost a.nd  individuals
have  different  attitudes towards  risk.
We formalize our reasoning  in a fully  specified, general equilibdum model of money
and debt. In this model,  fiat money.serves  as a medium of ex&atrge,  a means  of payment
and a unit of account. In particular, the interaction of agent  preferences  atrd  the physical
environment  inplies that i)  fiat money has value as a medi"m of exchange  a.mong  those
who cannot  trade directly, even  if its rate of return is dominated  by that of a^nother  asset;ii)  people  bouow and lend, choosing  to specify  fiat money as the means  of payment by
which IOUs are settled;  and iii) in several  non-trivial circumstances,  fiat money  serYes  as
the unit of account,  i.e., IOUs promising  a {ixed nominal sum  of fiat money  are an optimal
contract form.  We wish to stress  that these  are all implications,  not assumptions,  of the
model. No feasible,  mutually advantageous  contracts  or narkets a.re  arbitrarily ruled out
and  no demand  for any asset  or contract  is imposed  on the model.
There is a large literature that  asks  why nominal uncontiDtent contracts  ale so
widespread.  Gottfries (1990) stresses  the role of labor market imperfections,  but  his
analysis  iacks explicit microfoundations  and his results  hinge  on the assumption  that there
is an urridentified  cost of writing contingent  coutracts. Cooper  (fSAA)  also  focuses  on the
labor market in  a model with microfoundations,  but in his paper nominal contracts  are
geuerally  not optinal,  even  if firms are risk neutral, arid the contract only provides  risk
sharing  and  has  no aliocative  role.  (In our paper,  by contrast,  everybody  is risk averse  and
IOU  contracts serve  both a risk-sharing and an allocative role.)  Azariadis and Cooper
(1985)  show that uncontingent  contracts  may provide optimal risk sharing,  but hete too,
firms are risk neutral and in addition, the optimal contract is not noninal (in the sense
that it  is not payable in  fiat  money a.nd  that  it  specifies  an uncontingent  real wage).
Finally  Smith  (1985) studies an overlapping generatiotrs  economy in  which nominal
contracts are a device for  sorting out  different types of workers; but in  nore  general
environments  other sorting devices  a.re  likely to be available  and  optimal.
The paper outline is as follows.  Section  2 lays out the model of an overlapping
tenerations  ecotromy  with spatially separated  agents  born in each  generation. Section  3
proves  the optimality of nominal contracts  whea there are only relative price shocks  and
future preferences  are un-known. The general  properties  of an equilibrium with nominal
contracts  are described  in section  4.  In section  5, we show  that nominal contracts  lead tooptimal sharing  of aggregate  risk if individuals have the same  risk preferences.  Section  6
proves that  a  binding cash-in-advance  constraint on  the  settlement of  private debt
reinforces  the optimality of nominal contracts. Finally, section  7 contains  some  concluding
remarks.
2.  The  Model
This section  describes  the economic  mvironment.  A growing  population  is drstributed  over
a large, even  uumber  I  of contiguous  islands. The islands  are  located  in a circle and are
numbered  mnsecutively  in a clockwise  direction  arornd the circle  according  to the variable
i, i=1,2...I.  There  is a separate  market in each  island;  no centrafized  rtinter-islandrr  narket
exists. Eouseholds,  each  comprised  ol two partners,  live two periods. A new generation  is
born every  period.  Each  household  is endowed  with oae  unit of non-storable  output when
youag  and nothing when  old.
The population of newborn  households  on each  island is random.  An island can
either be "latgerr  or !'small". A large  island receives  a number  N, of newborn  households  in
period  t;  a ry!!  island receives  a number  dI,[,  of uewborn  households,  where  0<7.
Whether an island is large or small in  period t  is determined  by the realization  of the
random variable arr. For simplicity,  &Jr can only take two values,  1 and 2, with equal
probability.  If  rur=l, then all islands  for which  i  is even are large in period t, and all
islands  for which i  is odd are small. If  dt=2, then the opposite  is true.  Because  the total
number  of islands,  I, is assumed  to be even,  the total population  size  does  not depend  on
the realization  of arr.
Each island produces  a different commodity.  This difference  matters because  thepreferences  of  each household  depend on its  location on the circle.  When young, a
household  born in island i  wants  only to consume  the commodity  produced  on island i+1'
Except  for their location,  ali young  households  are  ideotical.t
When old, each  household  moves  to some  other island,  whose  commodity  it wants  to
consume.2  When young, the household  does  not yet know where  it  will move rvhen  old.
Its destiuation  when  old depends  on a preference  shock  that it will experieace  in the second
and last period of its life.  Each old individual has the same  probability of moving to an
odd or an even  island, and the saroe  number of old consumers  moves  to each  island. The
realization  of the preference  shock  is private information and cannot  be  learned  by others.
The only relevant difference  betweeu  islands  is whether  they are large (L) or small
(S); for this leason,  we can  write the expected  utility  function of an old household  without
reference  to  odd or even locations and to  his preferince shock, and we only need to
distinguish  between  households  born in a sma.Il  or large island.  The expected  utility  of a
household  born  in period t  on an island  of type k, for k-S,L  is:
2
uGl)  +  lE  u  (.f*,(,,*,))  =  u(*f)  +  |vi.f*,tr))  +  +v(cf+1(2)) (2.1)
ti:I
where xf ana  cf*,  detrote  its cousumption  when  young  and  old,  respectively,  and  where
U(.)  and V(.)  are twice-continuously  differentiable,  strictly increasing,  aod strictly
concave  functions.  Notice  that 1/2 is the probability  of ending  up on either  type  of island
when  old.
I  Townsend  (1987)  studies  a related  model  with spatially separated  individuals  in an
overlapping generbtions economy.  Eowever ir  his  model, udike  here, neighboring
individuals  only meet once  in their lifetime, and hence  cannot  write IOU contracts  among
themselves.
z  The randorn  assigtrment  of asetrts  to other islands  follows the models  of Townsend
(1989)  and  Mitsui and  Watanabe  (t9*90).Each period is  split  into  two  sub-periods.  In  the  first  sub-period everybody
observes  the realization  of the shock a.r  and one  partner of each  household  (young  and  old)
starting on island  i  travels to island  i*1.3  In  the second  sub-period the travelling
partner returns,  old households  move  to another  island,  and consumption  ta.kes  place. This
structure  of travel and the specified  preferences  generate  the following  trading pattern for a
household  born on island i.  The pattern is outlined  here  and charted  in Figue 1.
1)  youth
i.) first  sub-period
<ach household  is split  into two  units,  a buyer  a.ud  a seller;
the buyer travels  to island
i+1  arld  makes  purchases  by
issuing  IOUs payable  next
period;
ii.) second  sub-period
the debt repayer  travels  to
island i*1  aud repays  the
household's  IOUs with fiat
the  seller  remains on  island  i
and  sells  his  commodity  against
IOUs  receivable  in  the next Period
to  the  young buyers coming from
island  i-1.
the  debt  collector remains on  its
island and collects the  fiat  noney
'  repayment  of the Ious  of island i-1.
-the  partners reunite  at  the  home island
purchased  ftom their neighbor;
atrd consume  the  commodity
-the home  commodity  is sold  for fiat money  to the  arriving  oid  households.
2) old age
i.) first  sub-period
-the household  is again  split  into two,  a debrcollggigt  and  a debt  reoaJrer;
motrey;
ii. ) second  sub-period
-the two parttrers  reunite  and travel to some  other island;
-the househoid  purchases  the commodity of the destination  island with fiat
money,  then consumes  it.
I  The  division  of a household  itrto a pfitner who  travels  and  one  rrvho  stays  is adapted
fron a  model  attributed  to Lucas  by  Townsend  (fggO).In  the initial  period (period 0) there is a generation  of households  of size  No,
equally distributed among  all islands,  that simply wish to maximize consumption  on the
island where they are located.  This initiat  old generation  cannot trade until the second
sub-period  of the initial period.  It  has no endowment  of goods  but owus  a total of N0M0
nnil5 qf fiat money on each  island, implying an initial  aggregate  money supply equal  to
Mo=INoMo.
at the constant  (gross)  rate The aggregate  money supply is  assumed  to  $ortr
z=MrlMr_1.  Changes  in the stock  of fiat money  are  used  to finance  government  purchases
to be spent  in equal  amounts  in each  island.  Aggregate  population  grows  at the cotrstant
rate  n=Nr/Nr-r.  Shocks  to population  growth and to money  supply  Browth  are studied  in
section  5 below.
Let  bk  and ak  denote the  nominal value of  the  IOU  issued and accepted
respectively  by a young  household  born  in an island  oftype  k, and  let  mk be  the quantity
of money  that he holds,  for  k=L,S.  Then we can  write his budget  constraints  when  young
as
Lk \  ^h*k -t a  yr^r  h,  k=L,S  ,  h+k  (2.2a)
(2.2b) of  l nf + af  k=L,s
where  ph and pk  are the money prices  of the goocls  sold in an islanil of type  h and k
respectively.
When old, the consumer  faces  the budget  constraint:
pr*r(a,r*r)  .fn, s  -f  + Rl+r(,rt+1)af  - nf*r{"r*r)bf  =  Fl*r("r*r)  , h,k-s,L  ,  h+k  (2.3)
where  Rf*,  (rr*r),  nfnr(rr+r)  are  the  possibly  state-contingent,  gross  rates  of return  on
the IOUs  issued  by individuals  born  in islands  of type k and  h  respectively,  F,*r(rar*r)denotes  net nominal flnancial wealth, and nr*r(r.r,*r)  is the price faced  by the consumer
when old, which depends  on whether he ends  up on a la.rge  or small island, and hence  on
the realizations  of the state  ,,+t  (", well as  of his preference  shock  which we onit  here  to
simplify notation).  Note that since  the preference  shock  is private information,  individuala
cannot  write IOUs contingent  on the realization  of these  shocks. The question  of whether
equilibrium contracts  will be contingent  on the shock a.r,*,  which determines  which  islands
are  large  and  rrhich are  sma.ll  is addressed  in the next section.
The  previous asssmptions  about timing  have a straightforward but  important
implication for the nature of an equilibrium.  Na.mely,  ody  fiat money  will be accepted  il
payment  for an IOU.  The reason  is that the old, who are  scattered  among  the isla,uds,  ueed
fiat noney to carry out their consumption  purchases  when old.  In particular, because  of
the spatial sepaxation  betrveen  islands, a payable IOU  camot  be settled by offering in
e:<change  an IOU issued  by some  other island. Eence,  the settlement  of an IOU is subject
to a physically  imposed  cash-in-advance  constrairt, which can  be written as:
Rfnr(r,*r)  uf  s  .f  , k=L,s




In writing (2.5) we have used the fact that the young population  in a small island is a
fraction d  of the population  in a large  island.
Since  at the start of any period fiat money is held only by the old, and since  by
assunptiotr  the old a.re  drawn equally  from all islands,  the Boney supply  in each  island  is
N'Mr  .  With  aggregate  population  growing at the (gross)  rate n and with money  supply






An implication of the market ciearing condrtions  (2.5) aud (2.6) is that  the aggregate
nominal  wealth of the old must equal  the total stock  of fiat money
ldFs(r.,r*r)  + nl(lu,*r)l  I Nr/2  - Mr:  IN.M,
(2.7)
ms(rr*J + rl(r.r,*r)  = zMo(r/n)t
We can now define  a rational  expectations  competitive  equilibrium  with optimal
contracts  (hereafter,  simply  "equilibrium")  as  a sequence  of the vector  1nl*r, Ors,  U,? 
"rs,
CCqTTT
.rs,  *r? .rt,  Rl*r,  ptl, btl, 
"rt, 
-rt,  rrt,  .rtl  such  that  i) young  households  choose  money
balances,  IOUs payable and receivable,  and consumption  to  maximize expected  utility
taking prices  and interest rates as grven; ii) IOUs ta.ke  a form such  that it  is not possible
to increase  the orpected utility  of a member of any generation  t  without reducing  the
expected  utility  of another member of that  generation; iii)  each household  maximizes
o<pected  utility  basing  its decisions  on the probability distribution actually generated  by
the equilibrium; iv) markets  in IOUs and  fiat money  clea.r.
3. The Equilibrium Contract  If There  Is No Aggregate  Risk
In this section  rre discuss  urder what conditions  nominal IOU contracts  are optimal if the
only sources  of randomuess  are relative price risk and shocks  to preferences.  Essentially
aof:rvro  (u/n)t
-f:uo {,/"),10
these  conditions  identify rryhen  there  is no insurable  inclividual  risk in this economy.  Eence,
the purpose  of the section  is maiuly to i  ustrate a method of analysis  and to ciarify the
properties  of the model, rather than to  derive any general  aud novel result. Section  5
extends  the analysis  to the more  interesting  case  of aggregate  price  level  shocks.
An  IOU  contract  is  a promise  to pay  Rl*r, j=L,S,  units  of  fiat money  tonorrow,  for
each  IOU issued  tod.ay. If  Ri+l  is not contingent  on the rea.Iization  of any shock,  then we
say that the IOU is a  nominal coutract,rt  since  it  is a promise  to pay a fixed a,mount  of
money  tomorrow, i[espective of the state of the world.  The rate of return  Ri*,  cauaot
be contingent on the preference  shock when old, since the realization of this shock  is
private in{ormation. The remaining  question  is whether  a contract  for which Rl*,  is not
contingent  on the realization of  r,.rr*, is optimal, in the sense  that it  is not possible  to
increase  the expected  utility  of a member of any getreration t  without reducing  the
oeected utility  of another member  of that sa.me  generation. The answer  is contained  in
the followiag:
ProFsition 1: ff aggregate  population  growth  and  money  supply  growth  are  not random'
then  the  nominal  contract  is an  optimal  IOU contract.
The proof  is straightforward. An "optimal contracttr  between  the households  of
neighboring  islands  maximizes  the expectd utility of those  born  on a small  island  for a
given  level  of orpected  utiiity of those  born  on  a large  isiand,  subject  to the  constraints  and
the equilibriu:n  conditions  out[ned  in the previous  section.  Consider  first an equilibrium
in which  the  cash-in-advance  constraints  (2.4)  are  not binding. Then,  combining  (2.1)  and
(2.3),  and  noting  that every  household  has  a probability  of.  ll2  of.  ending  up in a large  or
small  isla.nd,  we can  characterize  an optima^l  contract  as  a choice  of fs(r,u),  Ft(r.r)  for each  r.r11
to ma>cirnize
",{}"ld-,,  ]  . +"lY]  *  r  fv--f}vrpi  . }"t#,  r]]i (3.1)
subject  to  af'sirl  + fL1";  =  Ztvto(z|")r,  for  a:1,2  and  where  E" is the expectations
operator  with respect  to o.  Notice  that we have  used  the symmetry  of the model  to write
ps *d  pL as  independent  of a.r.
The resulting  first order  conditions  may be  written as
v,  [dI$l 7o'  +  v,  [f,4-nl  ynt  =  o,r{v, 
ffi  r" * u,  {*J  n'l {t.z)
fot u=1,2 and  for every  t.
This condition  is satisfied  by f'sic,r;:f's  and ft(t.4=fl  for all realizations  of o'. From the
definitions  oi f s(r.r)  ana  nt(r,,r)  in (2.3),  we  see  that they  are  not contingent  on r.r  if Rs and
R- a^re  not contingent  on ar. Hence  a nominal  contract  is opiimal.
If the cash-in-advance  constraint  (2.4)  is binding, then a  Jortiori a nominal  coutract
is optimal, since  a binding cash-in-advance  cotrstraint  makes  it  rnore  difEcult to reshuffle
cash  between  borrowers  and lenders  through contingent  rates  of return.  The fornal proof
is a bit more complicated,  and  is provided  in section  6 below  as  a proof  to Proposition  4.
The intuition underlying  Proposition  l is also  straightforwartl. Suppose  that Rj*,  is
not contingent  oo  ,,*r,  and consider  the expected  utility  of an old individual, conditional
on the realization  of  arr*r, but not on that of the preference  shock. By assumption  every
old individual has  the same  probability of travelling to an odd  oI an even  island. But then,
whether  odd islands  are small and even  islands  are large, or vice versa,  iS irrelevant: tbe
realization of  rt+l  does l.ot  affect this  expected  utility.  Eence, an IOU  contract
contingent  oo  ,t+1 alone  cannot  achieve  any relevant  risk sharing  among  individuals  bornL2
in contiguous  islands. A contract contingent  on both  ,r*,  *d  the destinations  of the old
(the  preference  shock) could.  But  such a  contract is  ruled  out  by  an  incentive
compatibility  condition, since the  destinations  of  the  old are not  publidy  observable
ex-post.1 Therefore,  given  this incentive  cotrstraint,  a nominal  IOU contract  is optimal-
We should  note that the symmetry  of the model  plays a crucial role in the proof  of
this propositiou.  Suppose  for iustance that  individuals born in  an odd island have a
probability greater than 1/2 of going to  an odd island when old, and conversely  that
individuals born in an even  island are more likely to go to an even  island when  old'  It is
easy  to show  in this case  that individuals born in contiguous  islands  wish to insure  each
other against the  relative price shock by  writing  IOU  contracts contingetrt on  the
realization of r,r. Hence  nominal contracts are no longer optimal' even  if the preferelce
shock  is unobservable.
The general  lesson  to be drawn fton  this section  is that contingent  contracts  car
provide insurance  against relative price risk only if  individuals are suffrciently  different
from each  other itr an ex-ante sense.  Which relative price risk one  needs  to iusure  agailst
is  often ex-ante ulknown  to  the  contracting parties.  There are many consumption
decisions,  like going  to a movie  versus  going  out fol dinael, which a,re  difEcult to predict  in
aalvance.  These  decisions  are determioed  by random events  that are private information,
aad which therefore  cannot  be incorporated  in any contingent  cotrtract. If individuals  are
subject to  the same uncertainty about theil  future preferences,  so that  everybody  is
ex-atrte  identical, then nominal contlacts are optimal.  If instead  the contracting  parties
assign di{ferent probabilities to  alternative future consumption  baskets,  then cotrtracts
contingent  on relative price shocks  are optimal.  Naturally, in tbis case  a combination  of a
{  Altematively, we could  have made  the simpler but more restrictive  asumption  that
the destinatiotr  whtin  old is learned  only upon arrival (i.e., after the IOU's are  paid).13
nominal contract with  an explicit insurance  contract (or a future contract) would also  be
optimal.
Random relative prices present  the household  with  two types of risk -  the risk
that it will wart to purchase  an expensive  good  and the risk to the value  ofits assets.  The
first  type  of  risk  is  uninsurable because  it  is  a  shock to  unobseryable  preferencesl
Therefore,  the best  that a household  can  do is to minimize  the risk to the value  of its assets
by fixing the number  of dollars  it will have  available  for consumption  when  old.  A system
of contingent contracts with offsetting contingencies  that leave each  household  with the
.same..number  of dollars in each  state can accomplsh  this but in a needlessly  complicated
way that  requires  the verification of the state.  Contracts pronisiog fixed palments of
toods would avoid the verification of the state,  but would expose  the household  to the risk
that the goods  it is promised  have  a iow value. Only nominal  contracts  avoid  both the risk
to a household's  wealth and  the verification  of the state-
4. Properties  of the Equilibrium
This section  outlines  some  geaeral  properties  of the equilibrium,  including  the  valuation  of
the equilibri'rm  contracts. We retain  the assumption  that there  is no aggregate  risk, so
that nominal  contracts  are optimal ana  Rf*r(arr*r)=Rf+,  .  Under  this assumptioa,  a
young  household  born  at time t  in an  island  of type k  , k=S,L,  maximizes:
u  (bf  /pl  )  +  |vtrf*,/nf*,1  +  |v1rf*,/nf*,)  , h=s,L  , hrk (4.1)14
by  choice  or  -f  , tf  aod  af , subject  to  (2.2)  - (2.4)  .
The first order  conditions  are:
h
u,(bf  /pf  )  =  Rl*,Rln,  oh*,[v'{rf*,/ol*,1ji{+  v'1rf*,/rf*,)]
, ,  -  L  pt+r
(Rf+r  - 1)lv,(Ft+l/pf.,*  +  v,(Ff+1/pt.,,fJ  : r,f,i
where urf*r= lf  hf*,  is the inverse  of the (gross)  inflation rate in the price of the good
produced  in an islaud  of type  h, and pf  ls the Lagran8e  multiplier ofthe casb-in-advance
constraint (2.4), written in  real terms.  Thus, not surprisingly,  if  the cash-in-advance
constraint does  uot bind for the cousumers  born in island  k  (if  pl-O),  then the (gross)
lendingrateinthatislanclequalsunity(Rl*r=l)'Anclconversely'ifthecash-in-advance
coDstraint  binds  (if pl >0), then  IOUs receivable  earn  a positive  rate  of return  (Rf*rtl)
even  though  fiat money  is va.lued.  s
Section  1 of the appendix  characterizes  a statiooary  equilibrium,  namely  a consta,trt
equilibrium allocation supported  by constant relative prices,  interest rates aad inflation
rate.  Let qk b. th" real money  balances  demanded  by the young  born in an island of type
k  in such  equilibrium.  Then the clea.ring  of the Eoney market in each  type of island  at  t
reouires
fuint  : olnt  : M,/Iv,  =  rr.to(r/n)t,  k:s,L (4.3)
Imposing  (4.3) for periods t  and t*1  a,nd  taking ratios of the demand  and supply for
money  ia both periocls,  we obtain that the iuverse  of the inllation rate in the stationary
equiJibrium  is a=p,/pr*r-n  lz for dI  t.
$-za)
(4.2b)
A cash  discount  would be equivalent  to Rtil  > 1.15
It is proved  in the appendix  that in a neighborhood  of d+1, the Lagrange  multiplier
't.
px is non-increasing  in 4  and strictly decreasing  if  pk>0.  Intuitively, as  the inflation rate
rises  (as r drops),  individuals try  to reduce  their holdings  of real cash  balances. At some
point the  cash-in-advance  constraint starts to  bind, and when that  happens  nomitral
interest rates on the IOU  contracts rise above unity.  As inllation  keeps rising, the
cash-in-advance  comtraint becomes  more  and  more  binding,  and pk increases.a
5. Equilibrium Contracts  With Aggregate  Randomness
AggreBate  outout shocks  We now discuss  the desirability of nominal cotrtracts
extends  when  there is randomness  in aggregate  output or in the fiat money  stock.  As an
example  of an economy  with randomness  in aggregate  output, suppose  that the (gross)  rate
of population  growth, o*= N,/Nr_r  , is an always  positive  i.i.d. random  variable,  rvhile  the
stock of fiat money grows at the co$tant  rate z, like iu the previous  sections. In this
section  we consider  equilibria in  which the cash-in-advance  constraint is not binding.
Equilibria with binding cash-in-advance  constraints  are  stuclied  in the next section.
The stationary distribution of growth rates of population  ensures  the existence  of
stationary equilibrium like  the  one described  in  the previous section.  In  particular,
repeating  the argument  of the previous  section,  the inverse  of the inllation rate betr,veen  t
6 ,  a  liquidity  .tu1sh.  (i.e;,  a  more  bjn$ug  cash-i-n  - adva.nce
constraint)  is
the cash-in-i the cash-in-advance  constraint-  becomes  more binding,  young  households,reduce  _thgir
In  this  economv. a  liouiditv  cruach  (i.e..  a  more  binding  cash-in-adva.nce
jrt)  is associatea  *ltn  hiEher  (and not lorier)'real money  balanEes-.  - Intqitively., as
demand  of consumption  loans. The equilibrium counierpart  is that more  toods are  sold  for
cash  (to the old) and less  for credit (to the voune) so that real noney balances  ircrease.




is due fo the fact that the
cash-in-advance  constraint binds the repayment  of consumotion  loans, rather than the
ourchase  of consumer  qoods,  as  itr the  famiht  nodels  o-f  hrcas  (1980)  and  Svelsson  (1983).
We conjecture  that, wlth a labor-leisure  choice  when  young, the real money  balances  will
no  longer  always  increase  with expected  inflation, even  though p" would.16
and  t+1  is:
"f  =  of/nf*,  :
M,  /qkN.
E' _  t  , -------------i-




In  addition, the equilibrium relative price between  the commodities  sold in large
and small islands is unaffected  by the aggregate  shock, since by  (4.3) it  is given by:
nflnf=OqsTnr for atl  t.  Thus, the risk to the value of fiat money  posed  by the aggregate
population shocks  strikes money-holders  belonging  to the same  generation  iu  the same
way, irrespective  of where they are born.  A large realization  of nr*,  makes  households
from both large and sma.ll  islaads  of generation  t better ofr by increasing  the value  of their
real money  balances,  while for a small  rea.lization  of nr*,  both members  of generation  t are
worse  off.  Therefore  this aggregate  risk cannot  be  insured  away,  but it can only be shared
between  households  born in different  islands  and belonging  to the same  generation.
If  all  islands are alike, (if  F1),  then all  nembers of the sane generation  are
identical. In this case  optimal risk sharing  requires  that everybody  fuces  exactly the same
risk.  Since every individual is a party to two opposite  contracts,  optiroal risk sharing
imposes  only the general  requirement  that exactly the same  contingencies  be incorporated
in every  contract.  When this requirement  is satisfied,  the effect  of the aggregate  shock  on
the two IOU contracts  written by every  individual ofilset  each  other exactly;  the aggregate
shock  then only affects  individual welfare  by chan6ing  the purchasing  power  of real money
balances,  and since  everybody  within  a generation  is identical, this is the same  for all.
Thus,  nomiual contracts  are  optinal, as  are  many other contracts.
When islands differ in size  (if  0<1), however,  individuals born in different  islands
have  net financial wealth of different  size. Nominal IOU contracts,  in this case,  expose  the
parties to a risk exactly proportional to their net financial wealth. Whether this form of
risk sharing  is optimal or not depends  on how risk aversion  changes  with wealth. As shournL7
in the following proposition,  if individual preferences  exhibit the same  degree  of constant
relative risk aversion,  then risk shoutd be borne in  proportion to  wealth, and nominal
contracts  a.re  indeed  ootimal:
Proposition  2:  If all households  exhibit the same  degree  of constant  relative  risk aversion,
fixed.  nominal contracts  are optimal even  in the presetrce  of shocks  to the aggregate  rate of
population  growth.
Prooi  As before,  an optimal contract maximizes  the expected  utility  of ihose  bora
on a small  island for a given  expected  utility  of those  born on a large  island. Repeating  the
procedure  outlined in the proof of Proposition  l,  we can write the first order condition  of
this maximun problem  as:
v,  [dgd"  J /ps  (o)  +  [dte+tn,,  "  J ln'  r"r
=  o.r{v,  lfurr,,, ]  lps(n)  +  u,  l*"i,, 1  lr'r'i] (5.2)
where  now  fk1.;  ana  pk are  also  contitrgent  on the realization  of the population  shock,  n.
^1-c  r
With  a constatrt  relative risk aversion  utility  function, V(c)=  91;t',  e>0, the
optimality  condition  (5.2)  becomes:
Fs(,,.,,,n)-a  .  Fs(o,n)-o -orf  Ft(a,,n)-a
;%jTtr4'  ;frff-o  =  onl;frI(i=q'
which simplifies  to
r-l('.,,n]  :  ss,-tla)
F"(ar,n)






case  of nominal  contracts.18
Equation  (S.4) reveals that  optimal  risk  sharing under constant relative risk
aversion  requires  that the ratio between  the wealth of tvo members  of the same  generation
born in  difierent types of islands must be the same  for all realizations  of the aggregate
shock.  Because  some fraction of  a  household's  wealth already lies in  its  fiat  money
balauces,  the simplest way to  achieve  a proportionate exposure  to aggregate  risk is to
denominate  all wealth (net IOUs as well as fiat  money) in nominal terms.  Eence  the
optimality of a system  of nominal  contracts.
Monetary shocks:  Suppose  now that the rate of growth of fiat money  is a serially
.[ncorrelated random variable, that  has a  time  t  realization we  denote as 2..  We
immediately  have:
Proposition  3:  If all households  extribit the same  degree  of constart relative risk aversion,
fixed nominal coutracts  a.re  optimal even  in the presence  of shocks  to the rate of growth of
fiat money.
To ulderstand this proposition,  it is simply necessary  to see  that ftom (5.1), shocks
to z have  the same  but opposite  effects  oD  the inflation rate as  shocks  to n.  A forrnal  proof
of Proposition  3 would therefore  follow the steps  of Proposition  2.
Risk sharing  with real assets  Our model  is a bit special  in its insistence  that a,n
optioal  system  of contracts  requires  that all contracts  be fixed in noninal returns.  Thjs
results  from the model's  45snmption  that fiai money  is the only source  of outside  wealth of
the old.  Suppose  instead  that households  will receive  fixed endowments  of real goods  when
old.z  If these  endowments  are not exactly proportionate  to a household's  equilibrium net
wealth, nomiual debt alonp  will no longer  proportionately  erpose  households  to aggretate
risk.  Eovsever,  the simple combination  of nominal debt and equity in real endowments
r  We leave  aside  the question  of how much endowments  could  be sold to acquire  the
fiat  money desired  by the^  old when they travel.  For a simple, if  arbitrary, &ample,
suppose  that the endowmetrts  can be sold by the old to the young but can-not  be used  to
repay  consnmption  loans  (so  that the cash-in-advance  constraint  may still bind).19
could aow be used to let each household  hold reat and net nominal assets  in  the same
proportion--thus exposing  theii portfolios  to the same  proportionate  risk.
To make  this a bit more  precise,  iet Xk and  Yk denote  the real stocks  of the otld antl
even  island goods  owned  in equilibrium by an old household  of type k and  let P"(ca,n)  and
P"(r,r,n)  represent  the nominal price of goods  on odd and even islands respectively  as
functions of r,,r  aud n.  We will  continue  to let Fk(r,r,u)  represent  the net nominal wealth
(initial money  balances  plus  net  nominal  IOUs  payable  in money)  of an old island  of type
k. Total  wealth  of an  old  household  of tvDe  k in nominal  terms  is now
'd(r'..,,")  + Po(or,n)Xk  + P"(r,,,,n)Yk  . (5.5)
Suppose  that households  write uominal contracts  (Fk(r,r,n)=fk; and  exchange  equity
shares  of the two types of endowments  so that the ratios of real equity to net Dominal
wealth  are  the same  positive  constant  p*arrd g"in  all household  portfolios;  i.e.,
+=,
Ftx
(5.6) ,  $=r,.
Then  the  ratio  of the  total wealth  of small  to Iarge  island  households  is
(1+ ,prPo(r.r,n)  +  rf"(r.r,n))Ft
(1+ tp*Po(ar,n)  +  grP"(ra,n))Fs FS =  --i
F"
(5.7)
wlich  is a constant  for all (r,l,n),  thus satisfying  the requirenent for optimal risk sharinS.
In this way portfolios containing  two simple  assets,  equity and nominal debt, can achieve
optimal risk sharing  against  both aggregate  (n) and  relative (  r,.r)  risk.
Other advantaees  of  nominal contracts  If  preferences  do not exhibit constatt
relative risk aversion,  then nomiual contracts no longer provide optimal risk sharing.
Eowever,  nominal contracts  are obviously  simpler  and  easier  to enforce.  Moreover,  the risk
sharing  offered  by contingent contracts can have at best only a second  order advantage
over nominal contracts since both parties to  nominal cotrtracts  share aggregate  risk in20
proportion to their wealth.  Therefore,  it is easy  to imagine  economies  in rvhich  some  cost
of incorporating  contitrgetrcies  will outweigh  the benefits.
One potential cost is  obvious: the cost of  observing  or verifying the shocks  to
population  or money  stock. Both population  and the money  stock  are aggregate  variables;
thus they may not be automatically  revealed  to irdividuals as would, say, an individual's
own endorvment  of goods. It  would be natural to assune then that  aggregate  variables
nay be observed  by an individual only at some  cost. A usefid  feature  of norninal  contracts
in  our model is  therefore that  they  share risk  whiie requiring no information about
aggregate  variables,  in contrast  to contracts  contingent  on the state. Any costs  iqcurred  il.
obserying  the state represents  a deadweight  loss  to the contractitrg  parties,  which may not
be offset  by the second  order  benefits  of risk sharing.a
The next section  shows  that rrhen cash-in-advance  constraints  bind, there is yet
another  cost  in incorporatitrg  contingencies  into cotrtracts.
6. Nominal  Contracts  and  Binding  Cash-in-Advance  Constraints
The  propositions  stated  to this point  in the paper  have  all been  restricted  to equilibria  in
which  the cash-in-advance  constraints  do not bind.  We deiayecl  our presentation  of the
case  of binding  cash-in-advance  constraints  because  nominal  contracts  are  more  likely to
s  In maay economies,  prices  reveal  all the information about aggregate  variables  that
individuals re{uire.  In our^  economy,  however,  individuals must repay their IOUs before
the market exihange  of the money  bwned by ihe arrivi-ug  old for the endowments  of the
youns. Hence.  IOIis must be settied  before  irices reveal  iheir information about the state
6f th6 world. Contracts  payable  in a fixed qriantity of goods  also  require  information  about
economic  aggregates.  Because  the settling  bf IOUs requires  payment  in mon-ey,  cotrtracts
requiring  a!"ayient  worth a fixed basket  5f goods  must evaluite the price  oJ-these  goods  to
defermiie tie  monev owed.  Since  the priie  is not vet directlv observable,  it  must be
inferred fron  informatior  about the population and inoney stoik.  Therefore,  cotrtlacts
denomiuated  in fixed real terms are tie  same  as money  contlacts  contingent  on the state,
and  require  just as  much (poteutially costly)  information about  agtregate  variables.11
be  optimal in this case.
Since  coD.tracts  in our model economy  must be settled  using  fiat money,  contingent
contracts require that  agents  hold enough  fiat  money to make the maximum paymetrt
specified. A contingent  contract with the same  expected  payment  as some  loncontingent
contlact will  therefore  require the holding of more fiat mouey.  When cash-in-advance
cotrstraints  bind, there  is a utility  cost to the holding  of additional  money  balances.  If this
cost exceeds  the  benefit of  the risk  sharing through contingent contracts, a nominal
contract will be optimal despite  an opportuaity for mutually beneficial  risk sharing. Our
reasoning  is developed  more  formally in the proof of the following  proposition.
Proposition 4:  There exist economies  with  aggregate  randornness  a.nd non-constant
relative  risk aversion  for which Dominal  contracts  are the oDtimal  contract  forn because  of
binding cash-in-advance  constraints.
Proof:  To prove proposition  4, we first characterize  the Kuhl-Tucker  conditions  defining
a,n  optimal contract under aggregate  uncertainty and bincling  cash-in-advance  constraints.
We then present  a class  of preferences  whose  deviation  fron  constant  relative  risk aversion
is a continuous  function of some  parameter ?.  We then show  that there  exist sone values
of  'y  such  that the conditions  for the optimal contract are met when nominal  returns on
contracts  are  not contingent  on the state.
We take for granted  that the optimal contract  is independent  of  r,r  by the reasoning
already  explored  in Propositions  1 and 2, so  that we  may couceutrate  on the implications  of
the aggregate  randomness  in n.
To  keep the notation as simple as possible,  we presetrt  the proof of the simple
discrete  case  in which  n  takes  only two values, n.,  and  n" , and takes  each  value with22
equal  probability.  In this two-state case,  let RS and RL+eL denote  the nominal  rates of
returD in state 1, and let Rs+rS and Rt  denote  the nominal rates of return in state 2.
When cash-in-advance  constraints  bind, it  would make no setrse  to write cotrtracts  that
increase  the rate of returu paid to and bv the same  island in some  state since  that would
increase  the cash  balances  of both types  of islands. For this reason  we  restrict eS  and ef,  to
be of the same  sign, which we assume  is non-negative  without loss  of generality. Eere  we
are essentially  defining  n, to be the state in which optirnal risk sharing  requires  atr extra
payment  to small  island  agents.
An optimal contract  must then maximize  ou.,  .S20 and  etl0  a weighted.  averag€
of agents'  expected  utilities, constrained  by the cash-in-advance  constraints. By (2.3) the
Lagrangean  of this problem  in a stationary  equilibirum  is:
I  t  ,f__e1_ntttnt+,tf 4.+_  Yl----------i.- ' j=S,l  .  p,(o,)
, 1 9  ,,[ -s-(RS+rs)bs+  RL.s  'r
' j=S,L  L  pr(o"  )  I
+r{v--} E  v[--t-tlt*']utUlt  I ,  =j-S,L  L  pr(nl)  .  J
+ E  v;e1e5'trn'*--d[,  --Cif11
=j-S,L  L  p'(o,)  ))
r r  r'r 
,, l-s-{ns+.s;us] +r, [m"-(R"+e")u".]  + I (5.1)
where  p, and p, are the Lagrarge  multipiiers of the relevent  cash-in-advance  constraints.
Notice  that the cash-in-advance  constraint  binds ody for the iargest  nominal  interest  rate
paid by each  person.








with  sL-0  if  the strict inequality obtains.  Dilferentiating with respect  to  e, ieveals  a
similar condition  invoiving n,lt,  and  reversed  superscripts  L  and S.
The first treo  terms of (5.2) represent  the net marginal  social  benefit  of risk sharing
in state 1.  The marginal cost  is represented  by pr, the marginal  utility  cost  of holding  fiat
money  with a bindiug cash-in-advance  constraint.
We saw in Proposition  2 that there is no benefit to risk sharing  when  agents  have
the same  relative risk aversion. It  follows that as preferences  approach  constant  relative
risk aversion,  the value of risk sharing  goes  to zero. The ma.rginal  cost of holding money
balances  (7.1)  however,  does  uot necessarily  approach  zero  as  preferences  approach  constant
relative risk aversion. That is, the cash-in-advance  constraint  will be binding for a large
set of  constant relative risk  aversion preferences. Therefore, it  is  easy to  envisage
preferences  yielding a smali enough  value  of risk sharing  or a large  enough  value  of  p  such
that the condition  (5.2) holds  with a strict iaequality. In such  a case,  the optimal values  of
.L  aod  eS equal  zero,  implying that the optimal contract  is nominal.
It  may  help  at  this  point  to  consider the  class of  preferences  given  by
rr,.r,'l1-4  -t
V(c)- i:rt-o-----  , for a>0.  The function and its first derivative  are continuous
ftactions  of the paremetery. Since  the function  represents  constatrt  relative  risk aversion
when '7=0,  \rye  may therefore  consider ?  as a measure  of the deviation  ftom constant
relative  risk aversion  for preferences  in this class. Therefore,  the statemeot  that there
ocists  au economy  with non-constant  relative  risk aversion  but for which  the optimal24
coDtract  is nominal can be restated  as a statement  that for My  lt>o  we can choose  a
non-zero  'y  sufficiently dose to 0 such  that the first order condition  (5.2) with respect  to r
holds  with strict inequality.
Q.B.D.
Summarized,  the proof to Proposition  4 relies  on two points.  First, the benefit  of
contingent coutracts goes  to  zero as the difierence  in  relative risk aversion  of the two
parties  goes  to zero. Second,  the  cost  of adding  contingencies  to contracts,  which  is the
"  marginal  utility  cost of holding  money,  p, may well be strictly positive. It follows  directly
that  the costs will  exceed  the benefits in  some neighborhood  of constant relaiive'risk
aversion.  In this neighborhood  nominal  contracts  are  optimal.
It should  be noted that a similar proof of the optimality of nominal cotrtracts  enists
if  the  difference  in  relative risk  aversion  is negligible because  the ex ante wealth of
households  on large islands is suf6ciently close  to that  on small islands,  for any given
utility  function.  A similar proposition  might specify  some  cost p  of obseffing  the state  as
the cost of contingent cotrtracts  (replacing  p, the cost of holding ertra money),  along  the
lines  discussed  at the end  of the previous  section.
An  interesting  feature  of  the  optimal  contracts described in  the  proof  to
Ploposition  4 is that nominal contracts are more likelv to be optimal the greater  is the
marginal  utility  of money,  p.  As shown  in the appendix, p  gmerally increases  as  exoected
inflation rises,  implying that, other things being equal,  we are more likely to see  trominal
contracts  in times of high expected  inflation.  This may contribute  to explain  why nominal
contracts  ancl  the use  of money  as a unit of account  are not completely  abandoned  even  in
times of hlaerinilation, when both price level uncertainty and expected  inflation are very
high. The cost  of writing coutingencies  into coutracts  payable  in fiat money  increases  with25
(expected)  inflation because  of the extra money balances  that must be held.  During a
hyperinflation both expected  idlation  aud price level uncertainty rise, with  a,nbiguous
effects  on the optimality of nominal contracts.
7. Concluding  Rema.rks
We conclude  the paper with  a general  observation  on how the optimality  of nominal
contracts  relates  to some  fundamental  properties  of a monetary  ecooomy. In the general
eqtilibrium nodel of the previous  pages,  fiat money  coexists  with other assets,  it  can be
dominated  in rate of return, and serves  as a medium  of exchange,  as a tneans  of paymeut
and,  under  general  cirumstances,  as  a unit of account. Ii is a medium  of exchange  between
agents  that belong  to different generations,  because  they meet only once  in their lifetime.
It is a means  of payment  because  no centralized  narket exists  in which all contracts  can  be
simultaneously  cleared (or, equivalently, the velocity of circulation of contracts is not
ilfinite).  Thus, when coutracts  are settled,  the creditor demands  to be paid in fiat money
knowing that  he can exchange  money for  commodities  later on.  Finally, under the
conditions  discussed  in  the previous  sections,  the terms of the contract are expressed  in
units of fiat money (i.e., they are fixed noninal contracts). Eence  money  is also  a unit of
account.
These three  roles of  money are linked  to  each other,  and  are essential to
understanding  why nominal contracts  may be optimal even neglecting  computational  or
information gathering  costs.e Money  is used  as a Beans  of payrreat precisely  because  it is
also  a medium  of exchange.  And being  a mea,ns  of payment,  it is more  likely to be used  as
s  Niehans  (19?8),  Fama (1983)  and White (1984),  arnong  others,  refer to these
computational  aspects.26
a udt  of account.  (i.e., contracts  are  expressed  in fixed nominal  terms). The leason  is that
when money serves  as a means  of paymeDt  and is dominated  in late of rcturn, cash-florff
risk is important alongside  with purchasing  power  risk.  One way to reduce  the cash-flow
risk is to have  the means  of payment  also  serve  as  a unit of account'28
When (A.5) is not binding, R=l  and real money  balances  are determined  by (A.l),  which
simplifies  to
U'(1-q)-rV'(qr)-6.  (4.6)
Equation (A.6) implicitly  defines  equilibrinm real money  balances  as a furction of
n q:q+(r).  Under the assumption  that V(.)  has a relative risk aversion  coef[cient less
than 1,  q|>0,  that is, real money balances  decrease  as inflation increases  (as r  drops).
This is equivalent  to saying  that the substitution  effect  dominates  the income  effect.
If, on the other hand, (A.5) is biniling, then real money  balances  are  deternined  by
U'  (l-q)-rV'  (q"X+_q)'  = 0 (A.7)
which is obtained  by combining  (A.1) and (A.5).  In this equilibrium,  real money  balances
are  a6ain  a function  of r, q=Q+(r).  But here,  under  the assumptiou  that both U(.) and
V(.)  have a relative risk aversion  coefEcient  smaller than udty,  Q|<0.  That is, higher
inllation increases  real noney balances  in  equilibriun.  The intuition  is that when the
cash-in-advance  cotrstraitrt  binds, higher expected  inllation induces  households  to reduce
consunptiou when young.  As everybody  does  that, sales  against  IOUs are reduced  atrd
sales  against  cash  (and hence  real money  balances)  increase.  The key to urderstanding  this
lesult is that  the cash-in-advance  constraint here binds the repayrnent  of consumption
loans,  rather than directly the purchase  of consumer  goods. Finally, note that by (A.5),
the interest rate R also  rises  as r drops,  siuce  it moves  itr the same  direction  as  m.
Since  by (A.5) the cash-in-advaDce  constraitrt  is just binding  at q:1/2,  wg ce"
summarize  the foregoing  discussion  in the diagrams  of Figures  1 and 2, where  equilibrium
real money  balances  are shown  as a non-monotodc function of the inllation rate and the
iuterest rate is first constant  aud then rising with 1/r.  The threshold  inflation tate llll*
such  that the cash-in-advance  constraiut  just binds is defined  implicitly by the condition29
obtained  lrom (A.6):
v,(rl2) - frxv,(f  /2)  = o (A.8)
Finally, combining  (A.i)  and (A.4), the Lagrange  nultiplier  p on (A.5) can  be r,vritten  as:
(A.e)
Thus, for R-1,  p:0.  Whereas  for R>1, p is a furction of n  Under the same  condition
mentioned  above,  that U(.)  and V(.)  have  a relative risk aversion  coelficient  smaller  than
unity, aud differentiating  (A.9) with respect  to r, it is possible  to show  that p is decreasing
in  n, and strictiy  decreasing  if  1/r>1/z*,  i.e., the cash-in-advance  constraint becomes
more  binding as  inflation increases.
,=*+u'(l-q).30
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